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Peace building, as part of conflict resolution strategy, is challenged by 
several internal factors with socio-economic, political, governmental 
nature, and factors coming from outside the country and violent past 
under governance of ex Yugoslavia/Serbia. This process becomes more 
difficult by the transition from socialist to free economy.  
Kosovo independence undermines taking responsibilities by 
institutions on peace building perspective which will bring to the 
gradual reconciliation with neighbors, including Serbia. Growing 
authoritarian tendencies on decision making mechanisms chock already 
existing fragile democracy. Enhancing the rule of law and system of 
justice will create a good basement for elimination of corruption and 
increase the quality of governance as strengthening elements of the social 
peace and reconciliation between the communities inside Kosovo.                               
Even that, Kosovo institutions have made huge efforts in building the 
state mechanisms in preparation for the country’s independence phase. 
Rise of care in the rule of law, legislation implementation, efforts for 
combating corruption as a major source of state vulnerability, democratic 
institution building, and economic development, will be the challenges 
faced Kosovo’s future.    
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Introduction 
This article identifies current challenges to peace and stability in Kosovo 
after the war. Growing tendencies to establish institution of corruption within 
Kosovo institutions is worst sign for peace builders in Kosovo, engaged on 
building democratic state mechanisms as preconditions for inhibiting return at 
conflict circle. Also, here are highlighted difficulties as a result of regional and 
foreign factors challenging the peace building processes within Kosovo 
environment. Sooner evolvement of Kosovo institutions within EU cupolas will 
help this part of Balkans switch from organized infrastructure.    
 
Achievements and the Kosovo peace building challenges   
Successes and achievements by international community in Kosovo when 
building multiethnic institutional at different government levels are made 
through good collaboration with the locals.  
 However, “Although legally in charge of the entire territory, UNMIK has 
proven incapable of ending Belgrade’s de facto control of three and a half 
northern municipalities in Kosovo... as well as several Serb enclaves in central 
and eastern Kosovo. This inability to control all of Kosovo’s territory has led to 
the creation of a dual system in almost every aspect of political and economic 
life in Kosovo“.1 The civilian, and to some degree the military, international 
administration incapability to control overall Kosovo territory, created 
unfavorable circumstances for the future status of Kosovo. UNMIK did not 
managed to implement its own policies on integration the north and citizens 
from this part of Kosovo, leaving space for future state vulnerability as a 
potential for conflict. This administration hold on basic competencies for nine 
years, prevented Kosovo institutions to exercise responsibilities, contrary with 
reactions by several organizations2. As result, this heritage from UNMIK 
administration is going to disrupt peace building processes at the post 
independence period of Kosovo, failing to fulfill the Montevideo criteria3, to 
enter at interstate relations, respectively, to achieve international recognitions. 
Additionally, stuck between implementation the policy derived from 
international law, and pressures by locals pushing for independence, UNMIK 
didn’t impose the mandate to build neither to obstruct Kosovo state building.  
                                               
1 Daniel Serwer and Yll Bajraktari, United States Institute of Peace Special Report 172 August 
2006, Kosovo Ethnic Nationalism at Its Territorial Worst, www.usip.org 
2 Kosovo Roadmap (II) : Internal Benchmarks ICG Balkans Report N° 125, 1 March 2002,p. iii. 
3 Article 1 of Montevideo Convention on Rights and Obligations of States, 1933, States must have: 
a) Permanent population, b) determined territory , c) government and d) capacity to enter in 
relations with other states.  
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Call and Cook4 analyses made for 18 states experienced with UN peacekeeping 
missions between 1988 to 2002, all with political competencies for institution 
building, and 13 of them were qualified with nuances of authoritarian regimes. 
Most of these states have made improvements compared to their predecessors, 
but they failed to fulfill the expectations of international observers and local 
population. In Kosovo, after 2-3 year pro international and local mechanisms 
euphoria, and in the absence of achievements in terms of status settlement and 
expected socio-economic improvements, started euphoria took the opposite 
direction. After independence, originated the government's authoritarian 
tendencies by the government5, citizen dissatisfactions on expectations, 
inability to attract foreign direct investments, tendencies to sold everything to 
cover disability of finding alternative ways on economic recovery, lack of law 
implementation, and inability to establish the peaceful and civilized culture on 
resolving the political contests at the parliament but of leaving sessions by the 
governing parties,  made Kosovo institutions as undignified and with the 
potential for crisis. EULEX inability for action against violators of law in 
Kosovo against Serbian structures at north of Kosovo, not used when required 
executive mandate, weakens excepted confidence by majority population in 
Kosovo in a different approach than that of UNMIK, that mean decisiveness on 
improving the security structures, judiciary, and combats corruption as 
elements of stabile institution building. Kosovo institutions didn’t succeed to 
convince people from the north of Kosovo to be involved with country 
institutions through soft power and without violence, and thus opened the 
space to international mechanisms to get involved with offering the solutions 
which will encourage further with compromises for the north part of Kosovo. 
Neither international community “since 1999, when took the control did 
nothing to integrate that part under Kosovo governance. That situation, Serbs 
will use as strong argument for border change claim. Sure, such thing will open 
other discussions, i.e. idea that Preshevo Valley to be united with Kosovo, but 
I’m not going to say that will happen “.6 
                                               
4 Charles T. Call and Susan E. Cook, "On Democracy and Peacebuilding," Governance After War: 
Rethinking Democratization and Peacebuilding. Special issue (Vol. 9:2, Spring 2003) of Global 
Governance (co-edited by Charles Call and Susan Cook). www.reinner.com 
5 Decisions on ciment tarifs exported from Albania and removal after presions, boycott 
parliamentary séances by the government parties on July and October 2012, tendencies for 
orchestral with parliament by the government…are some of fragile actions by the government.  
6 Morton Abramovicz, Kosova të jetë e përgatitur për negociata të mundshme politike me 
Serbinë, interview at VOA with Keida Kostreci, July 1, 2010, at: http://lajme.shqiperia.com/ 
lajme/artikull/iden/1046922294/titulli/Abramovic-Kosova-te-jete-e-pergatitur-per-negociata-
te-mundshme-politike-me-Serbine, (Accessed 2 October , 2011). 
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Despite membership in IMF and WB, Kosovo experienced throwback on 
meeting the conditions for Stand-By Arrangements with IMF, which resulted 
with twice in cutting the macro finance assistance, before returning back to the 
previous stage. A handicap to peacebuilding stakeholder efforts is lack of 
results on openness toward the world, which will cost to the country in tackling 
the poverty, in the businesses, education, culture sectors…despite convincing 
promises that barriers on freedom of movement will be breakthrough after 
fifteen months.7 
Kosovo is not showing political will, except declarations in preventing the 
occurrence of the gray economy, corruption, organized crime 8 and 
intimidation against judges9, etc. 
Often, Kosovo institutions are presented not mindful in the international 
councils and mentoring which resulted with negative consequences for them. 
Avoidance of WB and IMF recommendations according the budget 
management, or negligence case by Ministry of Internal Affairs about the lack 
of planning and guidance of border patrols, leaving it to patrol officers liability, 
led to the arrest of two border policemen in Kosovo from Serbian gendarmerie. 
This was suggested in the 2010 EULEX Report given the Kosovo10. 
Based on what was said, peacebuilding challenges are those with inner 
nature, and those with regional and international implications, all interfere 
with each other. 
Undertaken activities by international and local community on the field of 
capacity building, institution building, rule of law, respecting the human rights, 
demilitarization, and transformation the alienated Kosovo society toward 
reconciliation, were not easy processes and were followed by their 
implementation difficulties. These difficulties were mainly due to the mutual 
exclusion and incompatibility between two main ethnic constituents’ in 
Kosovo, Albanians and the Serbs. Illegal Serbian structures in Kosovo, financed 
and politically inspired from the Serbian government11, present the biggest 
challenge to the peacebuilding processes. They continue to maintain a climate 
of intolerance and avoidance from cooperation by the Serbs from north with the 
institutions of newly created state.   
                                               
7 Promise by PDK leader, H.Thaçi during the 2009 election campaign. 
8 European Commission, Kosovo Progress Report, 2008/2009, point 4.3.4.p.23. 
9 European Commission, Kosovo* 2011 Progress Report, SEC(2011) 1207 final Brussels, 12.10. 
2011,p. 12. 
10 EULEX Report 2011, Përkrahja e Sundimit të Ligjit në Kosovë: Vlerësimi i Gjendjes,p. 22.at:  
http://www.eulex-kosovo.eu/docs/tracking/0959%20EA%20IJ%20EG%20BI%20-%20EULEX 
%20Programme%20Report%202011%20-%20ALB.pdf , (Accesed 12 august, 2012). 
11 Look at http://www.unosek.org/docref/2006-08-04_CG%20_Statement_on_the_situation_in_ 
Northern_Kosovo-english.pdf, (Accesed 12 august, 2012). 
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The fragile Kosovo institutions are immersed in the high level of corruption 
(nepotism, clans), mediocrity, and not at the competitive values, presenting a 
serious obstacle in the way of Kosovo towards international integration 
processes.  
As the purest part of ex Yugoslavia, Kosovo is still faced with that problem 
and continuous generating persistent unemployment and poverty rates which 
are the highest in Europe. 
Lack of movement of Kosovar citizens abroad, due to visa restrictions, the 
entrance at the labor market of about thirty thousand young and decreased 
indicators of foreign investments and remittances, challenge Kosovo and its 
institutions with a not easily or quickly addressable   socio-economic instability.  
Just achieving a balance between import and export will neutralize the mention 
obstacles, but it’s hard to reach attraction to the investors for a country just get 
out of a war. 
Kosovo's trade deficit elimination would be achieved through well-
structured private production, substitution of import, careful use of  the 
comparative advantages of different sectors in the region, etc. But, offered 
advantages by the enticement elements often neutralized by prohibitive ones. 
They include a lack of infrastructure, specially the power supply, which is not 
possible to be normalized for at least half a decade. This area has also been 
devouring the budget revenue. Quality of the roads and railway network and 
unfavorable approach to the coastal ports and international roads, made the 
trade in Kosovo to be costly. Difficulties to start and develop business12, despite 
some improvements, investment protection and performance of contracts make 
Kosovo ranks at last position within 27 countries of east Europe and central 
Asia13. So, in order to develop the private sector in Kosovo, favorable 
conditions at the field of business regulations must be created, as well a 
sustainable macroeconomic environment, infrastructure improvements, in 
addition to adopting and implementing the law on skills and workforce, and 
elimination favorism during tendering processes in the public sector. “The 
amount of single-source tendering rose to 164 million Euros in 2009, from 50 
million Euros in previous years. This has led to an unfriendly business 
environment, further damaged by the practice of individuals and groups close 
to senior governmental officials establishing ad hoc companies that then apply 
for and win tenders for public contracts. This has only added to suspicions of 
                                               
12World Bank,Doing Business 2012: Doing Business in a More Transparent World, 
http://www.doingbusiness.org/~/media/fpdkm/doing%20business/documents/profiles/co
untry/KSV.pdf , (Accessed 24 october, 2012). 
13 World Bank (2010a), www.doingbusiness.org. 
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enormous government corruption”.14  Support at the budget and spending 
policies of incoming international assistance and diaspora is not good exit 
policy from crisis.  
Employers at private business sector are subject to the cruel regime of their 
exploitation by employers. As dysfunctional, their Syndicates have no courage 
to deal with problems due to the threat by employers cutting the contracts.  
Implementation of the adopted laws stagnate in many aspects and presents 
concern and mistrust to the citizens related to functioning the rule of law. Even 
after four years as an independent state, Kosovo is facing symptoms of fragile 
democracy such are forms of corrupted governance, institutional 
irresponsibility, omission of sovereignty throughout its territory, lack of 
transparency, and unsatisfied level of justice system, health, education, 
security, central government and local personalities who are under the burden 
of charges of international and local judicial institutions, influenced and 
continue to influence negatively on the admissibility of the state of Kosovo in 
the world. According to Hoogenboom, there are four obstacles ahead15: (1) 
barriers between the state and citizens, (2) lack of rule of law, (3) interethnic 
mistrust and segregation, particularly between Serbs and Albanians, and (4) 
relations between Kosovo and Serbia.  Without significant progress in these 
four areas, Kosovo will not advance towards EU accession.  
Another important barrier element on Kosovo peacebuilding is that “the 
Kosovo Albanian political elite has almost entirely vanished, revealing a deeply 
divided political class that tends to engage in Personal rivalries at her than 
work towards programmatic solutions to Kosovo’s socioeconomic and political 
challenges”16, attempting to install their structures at all possible political and 
economical decision making, aiming enormous and unprecedented enrichment 
by political elite.  
Almost anyone form the Kosovo political elite doesn’t want to adopt a law 
on the origin of the property and who would have retroactive power of action. 
This reflects at the satisfactory low level by the Kosovo citizens on the work of 
                                               
14 Ilir Deda, The View from Kosovo: Challenges to Peace-building and State-building, CONNEC-
TIONs,The Quarterly Journal,Volume IX, Number 3 Summer 2010, at http://kms1.isn.ethz.ch/ 
serviceengine/Files/ISN/122276/ichaptersection_singledocument/8355a753-a644-407c-9e8c-
900dc29a0323/en/6_View_from_Kosovo.pdf,  p 88. (Accessed 2october, 2011). 
15 Jitske Hoogenboom ,The EU as a Peacebuilder in Kosovo, paper prepeared for CSDN Member 
State Meeting entitled Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding in the EU's Eastern 
Neighbourhood and the Western Balkans, Bucurest, Romania.  Jitske Hoogenboom, The EU as 
a Peacebuilder in Kosovo, IKV Pax Christi Utrecht, August 2011. 
16 Dominik Zaum States of Conflict:A case study on statebuilding in Kosovo,p. 5. October 2009, 
IPPR Institute, www.ippr.org, (Accessed  29 October, 2011). 
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state institutions, which is at lower level until now with only 21% related to the 
performance for government and 24% for Prime minister17. 
Continued insistence by Serbia in reopening the issue of political status, 
tendencies for partition of Kosovo or advancing the north of Kosovo in form of 
specific creature for this part, presents as one of the biggest challenge for 
reconciliation in the region. Until now, Kosovo institutions together with the 
internationals didn’t insisted lot at finding the ways to stretch the authority at 
this part of Kosovo population. The impression is that this is intended "to 
preserve Serbia’s face” and to have “win – win” option on the Kosovo conflict. 
Negotiations through Kosovo-Serbian developed topics should give impulse at 
that direction, but bypasses and obstacles which are made by the Serbian 
government in terms of not implementation the agreements (conclusions), 
handicapped the process of peacebuilding. Another picture is presented by the 
Serbians from south part of Kosovo, taking part at the process of 
decentralization, accommodated at the Kosovo institutions.  
Four years after declaration of the independence, Kosovo was recognized by 
around 46% of the world countries. Despite the positive opinion by 
International Court of Justice on the legality of the declaration of independence, 
few recognitions took place. 
Dose of complacency to the country's institutions and reception that 
international friends will perform recognition unfinished work, was not an 
appropriate tactic. The main problem lies to the five EU countries and mainly 
Russia which doesn’t recognize the state of Kosovo, disabling it to become a 
member of international mechanisms and to walk toward economic 
development and reconciliation, first inside Kosovo and in the region. This 
situation reflects at the continuation of coexistence between mechanisms, 
a)supporters of independence, government, b) those with neutrality regarding 
the status, EULEX, UNMIK, and OSCE, and c) those who reject Kosovo's 
statehood, Serbian “parallel structures”(because of lack Kosovo’s government 
structures). This is aggravating circumstance for the normalization of socio-
economic relations and the prospect of Kosovo. Active Serbian structures in 
Kosovo, which oppose the reality of independent state of Kosovo, cannot 
eliminate without clear statement coming from EU and USA.” Many fear the 
EU is not up to the task of resolving the Kosovo issue if only because of its 
divisions on Kosovo. The EU formula for progress in the area is still to be tested 
while hopes of accession have actually receded. Only in Kosovo has the U.S. 
                                               
17 UNDP, Pulsi Publik IV, 2012. 
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remained the dominant player, often to EU chagrin, because the people of 
Kosovo consider the U.S. as their only reliable friend”.18 
Even at difficult political and economic circumstances after the wars fought, 
Serbia achieved quick rehabilitation. Changes after removal of Milosevic from 
power started reflecting in the international politics pro Serbia19. It took the 
failure of consensus in the Security Council and the EU on the issue of Kosovo 
to prevent the new state to state-building processes.  Reforms made at the 
election process, rule of law, submission the most charismatic man, Milosevic, 
who had Serbs during the last decades and other defendants to the Court for 
War Crimes in the former Yugoslavia, combat organized crimes, the Serbian 
statement on not using the force for Kosovo conflict resolution, candidacy for 
membership at EU, etc. makes Serbia as good partner to the international 
community on Kosovo issue at the further developments. It reestablished the 
1244 resolution through a “footnote”, which will suite Kosovo at the integration 
processes. This agreement between Kosovo e Serbia according to Bugajski, 
“puts into question the legality of Kosovo's independence, footnote is 
potentially damaging”20. The same   opinion is one by Petiffer who consider the 
acceptance of footnote as “big strategic mistake for Kosovo”21. Even that and 
those coming from Kosovo opposition parties, pro agreement statements were 
made by government, EU and USA. In such way, UN SC returned away to her 
role at Kosovo issue, avoiding a policy attempted to avoid by transferring the 
problem of Kosovo to the EU decision-making, which, however, proved not be 
unique related to the case. Serbia, in fine print and through small door  achieve 
to settle technical negotiation process to political ones, which may result with 
harmful compromise going beyond Ahtisaari-s Plan.   
International community continuously stimulates a attractive policy toward 
Serbia, supporting to be part of EU and not become Russia’s alley, for which are 
engaged radicals and alleys in Serbia.   This situate double benefit for Serbia, its 
ranking alongside the West and, and in the case of Kosovo, implementation of 
win-win policy. To this effect it came with the support of its allies.  
In this situation is very expected, similarly to the reality in after war Kosovo, 
international community to recognize the reality on the ground for the north of 
                                               
18 Morton Abramowitz and James Hooper, Settling the Balkans, 07.08.2010. at: http://national-
interest.org/commentary/settling-balkans-3651,  (Accesed  29 September, 2011). 
19 Louis Michel, exterior minister of Belgium, talking on behalf of EU Presidency says: We didn’t 
change our mind. We are not in favor of independence. Reuters, 19 November 2001.  
20Interview at Radio Free Europe, at Telegrafi, http://www.telegrafi.com/lajme/bugajski-
pjesemarrja-pozitive-fusnota-negative-2-20595.html , (Accesed 29 February, 2012). 
21 James Petiffer at Telegrafi, 18 march 2012, http://www.telegrafi.com/lajme/pettifer-kosova-
ne-rrezik-2-21031.html , (Accesed 19 March, 2012). 
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Kosovo, because Serbia is going to exercise functions in that part of Kosovo. 22 
Such Serbian structures in Kosovo are known to the international community, 
to the locals and public, which are often as relevant to all those communities. 
Common nomenclature as “parallel structures” is not appropriate one. There 
are not other structures, to be parallel to them. They are illegal one, and 
challenges not only civilian international administration, but also structures of 
KFOR, through physical blockade of the roads and other obstacles. At the front 
of such structures are Serbian Minister for Kosovo, State Secretary for Kosovo, 
regional heads, mayors of municipalities 23... Serbia is going to finance complete 
its state system in Kosovo.  In the northern part the Kosovo government does 
not exercise its effectiveness and responsibilities, thus, as sovereignty is 
connected to responsibility therefore “ to be considered externally legitimate, 
Kosovo must achieve these conditions” 24  wrote Zaum. Led by the peaceful 
paradigms on conflict resolution and in keeping with the conclusions of the 
2005 World Summit, Kosovo governments had never tried to take any coercive 
measure in preventing Serbian structures. Those structures raised voices after 
Kosovo independence declaration. The government had set deadlines several 
times for stopping old Kosovo/Serbs registration plates, deadlines were 
prolonged by UNMIK administration or Kosovo institutions. Even when 
happened any arrest of municipal or security Serbian officers, they were 
released  with short procedures. 25 With such support for illegal structures, 
Serbia and supporters, especially Russian Federation prefer for Kosovo to 
remain frozen conflict.  “With such frozen conflict Russia will try to expand its 
influence, to prevent fictionalization of the new state which is pro west, pro 
NATO and pro American. This is what exactly is pretending Russia”   26. Serbia 
also, acted through allies and Russia to hamper Kosovo integration processes. 
                                               
22 Office of Coordinator for Strategy of the North: Report on parallel structures: Rezyme 
përmbledhëse Beogradi- me një këmbë në veri dhe me dorë të hapur në Bruksel, at 
http://www.kohaditore.com/repository/docs/Raporti_per_Veri_Maj_2011[2].pdf, (Accesed 
July 3, 2012). 
23 Goran Bogdanovic, Oliver Ivanovic, Goran Arsic, Nebojsha Nikolic, Miodrag Lazic, Djokica 
Stanojevic, Milos Dimitrijevic, Aleksandar Babincev, Slavko Stefanovic, Stevan Bozhovic, 
Boban Jevtic, Dobrosav Dobric, Srecko Spasic… are some of name leaders of parallel structures 
at different levels of governance.  
24 Dominik Zaum, The Sovereignty Paradox: The Norms and Politics of International State 
Building (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007). 
25 The case of arrest of ilegal mayor of Vitia municipality, Srecko Spasic, together with a group of 
„officials“ were relised after two days. See at: http://srb.time.mk/read/8facac8340/ 
eccfac26e7/index.html,  (Accesed 4 April, 2012). 
26 Janusz Bugajski, panelist at Council on Foreign Relations facilitated by  Paul B. Stares Director 
of the Center for Preventative Action and European Studies Program, and Charlie Kupchan, in 
the topics: Independence for Kosovo?: Managing the Consequences, 14 December 2007. 
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This was seen especially at influential role that Russia has to the Islamic 
countries at the processes of recognition.   
Economy as a determinant factor for success of peacebuilding and 
statebuilding, shows no expected positive signs due to the lack of appropriate 
development policies and isolation from foreign investments. Given that this 
sector is developing in parallel tracks, formal/informal economy and with 
enormous elements of corruption, it’s indicator of difficulties of the state of 
Kosovo. It depends from international support. With circumstances when 
international community is divided between supportive and unsupportive 
parts on the issue of recognitions for Kosovo sovereignty, make difficult 
process of state building.  
Kosovo has moved significantly to the fulfillment of services to citizens, but 
taking in consideration that international community and locals made large 
investments before and after independence, this leaves a large space to be 
desired. The ratio between investments and achievements is in disproportion. 
Isn’t only adolescence of Kosovo statehood challenging factor of non-
fulfillment of the expectations of the citizens. Global economic crisis is another 
misfortune at the road of a new emerging state. Symptoms of state fragility are 
coming from undemocratic, authoritative and ignorance behavior within 
different institution fields.  
Montaro27, considers that “Kosovo is not a filed state28, Kosovo is not a failed 
state, but it is critically weak along a number of axes, including its legacy of 
powerful regional clans, a criminal-political nexus, its extreme ethnic 
polarization, dynamics of parallel authorities competing for legitimacy and its 
deep economic stagnation”. 











                                               
27 Lucia Montanaro, The Kosovo statebuilding Conundrum: Addressing Fragility in a Contested 
State, Working Paper 91,FRIDE, October 2009, p. V. 
28 As filed states Katanga and Biafra, tend to separate from Congo respectively Nigeria, but after 
three years become again part of them. 
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Box: Peacbuilding challenges in Kosovo 
 Challenges 
Internal Lack of extension of the administration throughout the Kosovo territory   
Lack of transfer of powers to the locals for nearly nine years, 
Insufficient  participation of Serbs in Kosovo institutions, 
Different expectations of Albanians and Serbs on Kosovo's status, 
Small absorptive capacity of the labor force, unemployment, 
The fragility of the Kosovo institutions, corruption, nepotism, 
Unsatisfactory level of rule of law and security, 
Extreme political concurrence,   
Ethnic distrust and segregation, particularly between Serbs and 
Albanians, 
Infrastructural difficulties for carrying out the business (legal and 
physical), 
The lack of civil documentation and cadastral,  
Barriers between the state and its citizens 
Regional Relations between Serbia and Kosovo 
Serbia's insistence on reopening of political status negotiations, 
Funding of parallel structures 
Serbian indoctrination propaganda against achievements by the state of 
Kosovo  
Obstacles to the implementation of the reached agreements, 
Exterior Lack of movement of Kosovo citizens abroad, 
Continuous decline of foreign investment and remittances, 
Disunity of the EU countries regarding the recognition of Kosovo, 
Allowing Serbian parallel structures in Kosovo, 
Slow recognitions of Kosovo state, 
  
Conclusions:  
In order to achieve socio-economic stability and sustainable peace, Kosovo 
institutions should be more open to citizens, insist at implementation of the 
legislation, approach to peace-building as a dynamic construct through 
communication routes with people aimed at eliminating the root causes of the 
conflict and try to work on elimination the internal, regional and exterior 
challenges. They should stop authoritarian decision-making practices which 
have negative effects on the public. Behavior of state authorities towards 
establishing dialogue with northern Serbs should occupy their policy agenda, 
without forgetting other communities. International support must be focused 
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